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Abstract
It has been well established that in a bimatrix game, the rank of the matrix formed
by summing the payoff (or cost) matrices of the players has an impact on the runtime
of the algorithms that converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game. In this paper, we
devise a fast linear time algorithm that exploits strategic equivalence between bimatrix
games to identify whether or not a given bimatrix game is strategically equivalent to a
zero-sum game, and if it is, then we present an algorithm that computes a strategically
equivalent zero-sum game.
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1 Introduction
The study of game theory - the model of strategic interaction between rational agents - has
a rich history dating back to the initiation of the field by John von Neumann in 1928 [1].
The relatively recent rapid growth in computing power, the Internet, and game theoretical
models in engineering and computer science has led to significant interest in devising fast
algorithms for computation of solutions in games. Indeed, this intersection of computer
science, game theory, and economic theory has led to the creation of a new field of study
called Algorithmic Game Theory [2].
Computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) in a k-player finite normal-form game is one of the
fundamental problems for Algorithmic Game Theory.1 Due to the well known theorem by
Nash in 1951, we know that every finite game has a solution, possibly in mixed strategies
[3]. However, computation of a NE has been shown to be computationally hard. For k ≥ 3,
[4, 5] proved that computing a NE is Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed Version (PPAD)
complete. Indeed, even the seemingly simpler 2-player bimatrix case has been shown to be
PPAD-complete [6]. For any bimatrix game, the classic Lemke-Howson algorithm [7] is
guaranteed to find a NE. However, this algorithm is known to have exponential running
time [8]. For surveys on computational issues of NE see [9, 10] and [2, Chapter 2].
In this work we focus on finite, 2-player bimatrix games in which the payoffs to the
players can be represented as two matrices, A and B. With the hardness of computing a
NE in the bimatrix case well established, identifying classes of games whose solutions can
be computed efficiently is an active area of research. As an example in bimatrix games,
one can compute the solution of zero-sum games2 in polynomial time using the minimax
theorem and a simple linear program [11, p. 152]. Another subclass of games that admits a
polynomial time solution is the class of strategically zero-sum games introduced by Moulin
1Nash equilibrium is an acceptable and a widely used solution concept for games, and we define it later
in the paper.
2A game is called a zero sum game if the sum of payoffs of the players is identically zero for all actions
of the players.
2
and Vial in 1978 [12]. They identify a class of games that are strategically-equivalent to
some zero-sum game and therefore have exactly the same set of NE as the zero-sum game.
For these games, Moulin and Vial propose a characterization that, in polynomial time, can
check for the strategically zero-sum property and, if it exists, calculate the resulting zero-
sum game. More recently, Kontogiannis and Spirakis studied mutually concave bimatrix
games and provided a polynomial time characterization based on solving a convex quadratic
program. Interestingly, they also conclude that the mutually concave property is equivalent
to the strategically zero-sum property.
In contrast to computing an exact solution in games, other recent work has focused
on devising polynomial time algorithms for computing approximate Nash equilibria of spe-
cial subclasses of bimatrix games. In [13], the authors consider games where both payoff
matrices have fixed rank k and propose a quasi-polynomial time algorithm for comput-
ing approximate Nash equilibrium. In [14], the authors define constant rank games where
rank(A+B) = k and provide a polynomial time algorithm to compute an approximate
Nash equilibrium. For rank-1 games, [15] devised an algorithm that can compute the solu-
tion in polynomial time. Here we note that rank-0 games are clearly zero-sum games. With
the polynomial tractability of rank-k games for k ≤ 1 established, one could hope that there
exists polynomial algorithms for other low-rank games. Unfortunately, a recent result has
shown that rank-k games for k ≥ 3 are PPAD-hard [16]. The case of rank-2 games is still
unresolved.
1.1 Prior Work
Many papers in the literature have explored the concept of equivalent classes of games.
One such concept is strategic equivalence, those games that share exactly the same set of
NE. Indeed, for a classical example, von Neumann and Morgenstern studied strategically
equivalent n-person zero-sum games [11, p. 245] and constant-sum games [11, p. 346].
In a recent work by Possieri and Hespanha, the authors consider the problem of designing
strategically equivalent games [17]. As such, given a bimatrix game G, their problem
is to design a family of games that is either weakly strategically equivalent3 or strongly
strategically equivalent.4 Since this work falls into the category of mechanism design, it is
incompatible with the work that we present here. Indeed, we consider the inverse problem-
given a bimatrix game G, does there exist a strategically equivalent zero-sum game.
More closely related to our work is the class of strategically zero-sum games defined by
Moulin and Vial in [12]. They study the class of games in which no completely mixed NE
can be improved upon via a correlation strategy and come to the conclusion that these
games are the class of strategically zero-sum games. For the bimatrix case, they provide
a complete characterization of strategically zero-sum games [12, Theorem 2]. While the
authors do not analyze the algorithmic implications of their characterization, Kontogiannis
and Spirakis do analyze the approach in their work on mutually concave games. They find
that the characterization in [12, Theorem 2] can determine whether a bimatrix game is
strategically zero-sum, and, if so, calculate an equivalent zero-sum game in time O(m3n3).
3The authors of [17] define weak strategic equivalence as games the have the same NE in pure strategies.
4The authors of [17] define strong strategic equivalence as games that have the same NE in both mixed
and pure strategies.
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Around the same time, Isaacson and Millham studied a class of bimatrix games that
they characterized as row-constant games [18]. They define row-constant games as those
bimatrix games where the sum of the payoff matrices is a matrix with constant rows. In
their work, they show that the NE strategies of a row-constant game can be found via
solving the zero-sum game (m,n,A,−A). Comparing [18] and [12], one can easily see that
row-constant games form a subclass of strategically zero-sum games.
Closely related to strategically zero-sum bimatrix games are the class of strictly competi-
tive games [19]. In a strictly competitive game, if both players change their mixed strategies,
then either the payoffs remain unchanged, or one of the two payoffs increases while the other
payoff decreases. In other words, all possible outcomes are Pareto optimal. It has long been
claimed that strictly competitive games share many common and desirable NE features with
zero-sum games, such as ordered interchangeability, NE payoff equivalence, and convexity
of the NE set5 [20]. Indeed, Aumann claims that strictly competitive games are equivalent
to zero-sum games [19]. Moulin and Vial proceed to cite Aumann’s claim when arguing that
strictly competitive games form a subclass of strategically zero-sum games [12, Example 2].
However, many years later Adler et. al. conducted a literature search and found that the
claim of equivalence of strictly competitive games and zero-sum games was often repeated,
but without formal proof [21]. They then proceeded to prove that this claim does indeed
hold true. Comparing the results of Adler et. al [21] to the characterization of strategically
zero-sum games in [12], one can observe that Moulin and Vial were correct in asserting that
strictly competitive games form a subclass of strategically zero-sum games.
Another class of games that shares some NE properties with zero-sum games is the class
of (weakly) unilaterally competitive games. As defined by Kats and Thisse in [22], a game is
unilaterally competitive if a unilateral change in strategy by one player results in a (weak)
increase in that player’s payoff if and only if it results in a (weak) decrease in the payoff
of all other players. A game is weakly unilaterally competitive if a unilateral change in
strategy by one player results in a strict increase in that player’s payoff, then the payoffs of
all other players (weakly) decrease. If the payoff of the player who makes the unilateral move
remains unchanged, then the payoffs of all players remain unchanged. For the two-player
case, strictly competitive games form a subclass of unilaterally competitive games, and
unilaterally competitive games form a subclass of weakly unilaterally competitive games.
For the bimatrix case, Kats and Thisse show that (weakly) unilaterally competitive games
have the ordered interchangeability and NE payoff equivalence properties [22]. However,
convexity of the NE set is only proved for infinite games with quasiconcave payoff functions.
Finally, in [23], Kontogiannis and Spirakis formulate a quadratic program where the
optimal solutions of the quadratic program constitute a subset of the correlated equilibria
of a bimatrix game. Furthermore, they then show that this subset of correlated equilibria
are exactly the NE of the game. In order to show polynomial tractability of the quadratic
program, they define a class of mutually concave bimatrix games. Surprisingly, they find
that their characterization of mutually concave bimatrix games is equivalent to Moulin and
Vial’s characterization of strategically zero-sum bimatrix games [23, Corollary 2]. While
5In [20], Friedman shows that the convexity of the NE set holds for infinite games with quasiconcave
payoff functions. At the time of that writing, it seemed to be widely accepted that this was true for bimatrix
strictly competitive games. In light of the results of [21], we see that the set of NE is convex for bimatrix
strictly competitive games.
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the time complexity of the original quadratic program is extremely high, Kontogiannis and
Spirakis propose a parameterized version of the Mangasarian and Stone quadratic program
that is guaranteed to be convex for a mutually concave game and has time complexity
O(n3.5) for 2 ≤ m ≤ n [23, Theorem 2]. With the problem of solving a mutually concave
game shown to be tractable, the authors then proceed to show that recognizing a mutually
concave game can be done in time O(m2n).
1.2 Our Contribution
Given a nonzero-sum bimatrix game, (m,n, A˜, B˜) ∈ Qm×n × Qm×n, we develop the SER0
algorithm that, in time linear in the size of the game, determines whether or not the given
game is strategically equivalent to some zero-sum game (m,n,A,−A). If so, our approach
also finds an equivalent zero-sum game in time O(mn). This equivalent zero-sum game can
then be solved with one call to a linear program solver. Since the two games are strategically
equivalent, the NE strategies of the equivalent zero-sum game are exactly the NE strategies
of the original nonzero-sum bimatrix game (m,n, A˜, B˜).
Most of the prior work on subclasses of bimatrix games focuses on characterizing those
games and proving some properties of the NE of the game [12, 18, 19, 21, 22]. However,
other than [23], these works do not discuss tractable methods for identifying whether a
game is in a particular subclass. Of course, identifying whether a game is row-constant is
rather trivial. However, that isn’t true for many of the other classes discussed in Subsection
1.1. In contrast, we focus here on efficient methods for identifying strategically equivalent
rank-0 games. In addition, as we show in Section 5, our algorithm also efficiently identifies
strictly competitive games.
In comparison to prior work on strategically zero-sum games [12], the SER0 algorithm
identifies whether or not a game is strategically zero-sum in time O(mn) versus O(m3n3),
which is a significant improvement. Compared to identifying mutually concave games [23],
the SER0 algorithm is also significantly faster, providing a speedup of O(m). In addition,
the algorithm for mutually concave games in [23] does not find an equivalent zero-sum game.
Instead, they find a parameter that insures mutual concavity and find a NE of the original
game by solving a convex quadratic program. In contrast, the SER0 algorithm returns, in
linear time, an equivalent zero-sum game that can be solved via linear programming.
1.3 Outline of the Paper
We begin by defining the notation used throughout the paper and recalling some game-
theoretic definitions. Then, in Section 3 we formulate the problem and informally present
the results. We defer formal statements and proofs of our results to the appendices. We
first show that if there exists γ > 0 and D ∈Mm×n(R) (we precisely defineMm×n(R) later)
such that B˜ + γA˜ = D, then the nonzero-sum game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent
to the zero-sum game (m,n,A,−A). Following that, we present an efficient method for
computing γ and present a decomposition of the matrix D in Theorem 14 based on the
Wedderburn Rank Reduction Formula, which is a classical result in linear algebra. While
the Wedderburn Rank Reduction Formula provides the analytical result that we desire, the
complexity of directly implementing the algorithm can be high. Therefore, in Appendix C
we show an efficient technique for implementing the technique for a matrix D ∈Mm×n(R).
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While the results in in Section 3 apply in general to real bimatrix games with (m,n, A˜, B˜) ∈
Rm×n × Rm×n, for the purposes of algorithmic analysis in Section 4 we constrain the prob-
lem to rational bimatrix games with (m,n, A˜, B˜) ∈ Qm×n×Qm×n. In Section 4, we provide
an algorithmic analysis of a shortened version of the SER0 algorithm while presenting an
in-depth discussion in Appendix D.
We then present some additional discussion on the convexity of the set of NE in a
strategically zero-sum game and numerical results.
1.4 Notation
We use 1n and 0n to denote, respectively, the all ones and all zeros vectors of length n. All
vectors are annotated by bold font, e.g u, and all vectors are treated as column vectors. ∆n
is the set of probability distributions over {1, . . . , n}, where
∆n =
{
p | pi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
n∑
i=1
pi = 1
}
.
Let ej , j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, denote the vector with 1 in the jth position and 0’s elsewhere.
Consider a matrix C. We use rank(C) to indicate the rank of the matrix C. ColSpan(C)
indicates the subspace spanned by the columns of the matrix C, also known as the column
space of the matrix C. We indicate the nullspace of the matrix C, the space containing all
solutions to Cx = 0m, as null(C). In addition, we use C
(j) to denote the jth column of C
and C(i) to denote the i
th row of C.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some basic definitions in bimatrix games and the definition of
strategic equivalence in bimatrix games.
We consider here a two player game, in which player 1 (the row player) has m actions
and player 2 (the column player) has n actions. Player 1’s set of pure strategies is denoted
by S1 = {1, . . . ,m} and player 2’s set of pure strategies is S2 = {1, . . . , n}. If the players
play pure strategies (i, j) ∈ S1 × S2, then player 1 receives a payoff of aij and player 2
receives bij .
We let A = [aij ] ∈ Rm×n represent the payoff matrix of player 1 and B = [bij ] ∈ Rm×n
represent the payoff matrix of player 2. As the two-player finite game can be represented by
two matrices, this game is commonly referred to as a bimatrix game. The bimatrix game
is then defined by the tuple (m,n,A,B). Define the m× n matrix C as the sum of the two
payoff matrices, C := A+B. We define the rank of a game as rank(C).6
Players may also play mixed strategies, which correspond to a probability distribution
over the available set of pure strategies. Player 1 has mixed strategies p and player 2 has
mixed strategies q, where p ∈ ∆m and q ∈ ∆n. Using the notation introduced above,
player 1 has expected payoff pTAq and player 2 has expected payoff pTBq.
6Some authors define the rank of the game to be the maximum of the rank of the two matrices A and
B, but this is not the case here.
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2.1 Strategic Equivalence in Bimatrix Games
A Nash Equilibrium is defined as a tuple of strategies (p∗,q∗) such that each player’s
strategy is an optimal response to the other player’s strategy. In other words, neither
player can benefit, in expectation, by unilaterally deviating from the Nash Equilibrium.
This is made precise in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium [3]). We refer to the pair of strategies (p∗,q∗) as a Nash
Equilibrium (NE) if and only if:
p∗TAq∗ ≥ pTAq∗ ∀ p ∈ ∆m,
p∗TBq∗ ≥ p∗TBq ∀ q ∈ ∆n.
It is a well known fact due to Nash [3] that every bimatrix game with a finite set of
pure strategies has at least one NE in mixed strategies. However, one can define games in
which multiple NE exist in mixed strategies. Let Φ : Rm×n × Rm×n ⇒ ∆m × ∆n be the
Nash equilibrium correspondence7: Given the matrices (A,B), Φ(A,B) ⊂ ∆m×∆n denotes
the set of all Nash equilibria of the game (m,n,A,B). Note that due to the result in [3],
Φ(A,B) is nonempty for every (A,B) ∈ Rm×n × Rm×n.
We say that two games are strategically equivalent if both games have the same set of
players, the same set of strategies per player, and the same set of Nash equilibria. The
following definition formalizes this concept.
Definition 2. The 2-player finite games (m,n,A,B) and (m,n, A˜, B˜) are strategically
equivalent iff Φ(A,B) = Φ(A˜, B˜).
We now have a well known Lemma on strategic equivalence in bimatrix games that
is typically stated without proof (e.g [12, 23]). As we were unable to find a proof in the
literature, we state the relatively simple proof here.
Lemma 1. Let A,B ∈ Rm×n be two matrices. Let A˜ = α1A+β11muT and B˜ = α2B+β2v1Tn
where β1, β2 ∈ R, α1, α2 ∈ R>0, u ∈ Rn, and v ∈ Rm. Then the game (m,n,A,B) is
strategically equivalent to (m,n, A˜, B˜).
Proof. Since p ∈ ∆m and q ∈ ∆m, we have pT1m = 1 and 1Tnq = 1. Then, ∀(p,q) ∈
(∆m ×∆n) we have:
pTA˜q = pT(α1A+ β11mu
T)q = α1p
TAq + β1u
Tq,
pTB˜q = pT(α2B + β2v1
T
n)q = α2p
TBq + β2p
Tv.
Now, assume that (p∗,q∗) is an NE of (m,n, A˜, B˜). Then, for player 1,
p∗TA˜q∗ = α1p∗TAq∗ + β1uTq∗
≥ α1pTAq∗ + β1uTq∗ = pTA˜q∗ ∀p ∈ ∆m
⇐⇒ p∗TAq∗ ≥ pTAq∗ ∀p ∈ ∆m.
7A correspondence is a set valued map [24, p. 555].
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Similarly, for player 2,
p∗TB˜q∗ = α2p∗TBq∗ + β2p∗Tv
≥ α2p∗TBq + β2p∗Tv = p∗TB˜q ∀q ∈ ∆n
⇐⇒ p∗TBq∗ ≥ p∗TBq ∀q ∈ ∆n.
Then Definition 2 is satisfied, and (p∗,q∗) is an NE of (m,n,A,B) if and only if (p∗,q∗) is
an NE of (m,n, A˜, B˜).
3 Problem Formulation and Main Results
In this section we show a technique for identifying and solving games that are strategically
equivalent to a zero-sum game. This technique is closely related to the strategically zero-sum
games in [12] and the mutually concave games in [23].
We begin by assuming that given a nonzero-sum game (m,n, A˜, B˜), there exists a posi-
tive affine transformation such that (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to the zero-sum
game (m,n,A,−A). We later show the necessary and sufficient conditions under which this
assumption holds true.
From Lemma 1, we conclude that if there exists β1, β2 ∈ R, α1, α2 ∈ R>0, u ∈ Rn, and
v ∈ Rm such that:
A˜ = α1A+ β11mu
T, (1)
B˜ = −α2A+ β2v1Tn (2)
then (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to (m,n,A,−A). Throughout the remainder of
this work we refer to this notion of strategic equivalence as a positive affine transformation
(PAT). If α1 = α2, we call it a uniform positive affine transformation (UPAT).
Combining (1) and (2), we have:
B˜ = −α2
α1
A˜+
α2
α1
β11mu
T + β2v1
T
n . (3)
Defining γ := α2α1 and D := γβ11mu
T + β2v1
T
n , we rewrite (3) as:
B˜ + γA˜ = γβ11mu
T + β2v1
T
n = D. (4)
Clearly, the matrix D above has maximum rank(D) = 2. However, the existence of
γ ∈ R>0 and D, with rank(D) ≤ 2 is not sufficient to ensure strategic equivalence. Indeed,
from (4) one can see that we are searching for a matrix D ∈Mm×n(R), which we define as
Mm×n(R) =
{
M ∈ Rm×n
∣∣∣ there exists u ∈ Rn, and v ∈ Rm such that M = 1muT + v1Tn}.
Thus, what we have shown above if the following result:
Proposition 2. If (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to (m,n,A,−A) through PAT,
then γ > 0 and D ∈Mm×n(R).
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Proof. The proof follows from the preceding discussions.
In what follows, we show the converse holds, and further, we devise efficient algorithms
to compute γ and determine if D lies in the subspace Mm×n(R). In fact, the properties of
the subspace Mm×n(R) play a critical role in both the analytical and algorithmic results
of our work. However, we collect these properties in Appendix A.2 in order to not detract
from the main results.
Assumption 3. The game (m,n, A˜, B˜) satisfies
1. A˜, B˜ /∈Mm×n(R).
2. Pick (w, z) ∈ Rm × Rn such that 1Tmw = 0,1Tnz = 0,wTA˜z 6= 0. Define γ as
γ = −w
TB˜z
wTA˜z
.
Then, γ > 0.
3. The matrix D, defined as D := B˜ + γA˜, lies in the subspace Mm×n.
Theorem 4. If Assumption 3 holds, then there exists a matrix Aˆ ∈ Rm×n such that the
bimatrix game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to the zero-sum game (m,n, Aˆ,−Aˆ).
Proof. This result is a direct consequence of Theorem 14 and Theorem 15 proved in Ap-
pendix B.1.
Thus, our algorithm indeed ascertains whether or not a given game is strategically
equivalent to a zero sum game. Further, as we show in the next section, our algorithm
runs in time that is linear in the size of the game to compute Aˆ. This also leads to some
important implications about convexity of the set of Nash equilibria as discussed in Section
5.
In contrast to related works in [12], [23], which attempt to solve an equation (or system
of equations) similar to (4) we show that it is possible to decompose the problem into a
sequence of steps that allows us to reduce the overall complexity of the problem. In brief,
given a game (m,n, A˜, B˜) these steps are
1. Check if A˜ and/or B˜ are in Mm×n(R). If so, the game has a pure-strategy NE
(Proposition 16).
2. Calculate the candidate parameter γ (Proposition 13 and Corollary 17.2).
3. If γ > 0, then calculate the candidate D matrix (using γ computed in Step 2).
4. If D ∈ Mm×n(R), then the game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game
through a PAT (Theorems 14 and 15).
5. Calculate the appropriate equivalent zero-sum game, (m,n, Aˆ,−Aˆ), based on rank(D)
(Theorems 14 and 15, Corollary 17.1).
6. Solve the zero-sum game (m,n, Aˆ,−Aˆ) via one call to a Linear Programming (LP)
solver (see [11, p. 152]).
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Throughout the remainder of this section, we introduce the key results used in the steps
above informally and implement these steps on a simple example of rock-paper-scissors
game. For ease of exposition, we defer full proofs and other technical matter to the appen-
dices.
3.1 Solving for γ
Our next result shows a computationally tractable method for solving for the parameter γ.
Informal Statement of Proposition (13). If (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to (m,n,A,−A)
through a PAT and A˜, B˜ /∈Mm×n(R), then ∀(w, z) such that 1Tmw = 0,1Tnz = 0,wTA˜z 6= 0
we have that
γ =
α2
α1
= −w
TB˜z
wTA˜z
> 0. (5)
We present the full statement and formal proof of Proposition 13 in Section B. For the
intuition behind the proof, we note that for all D ∈Mm×n(R), and for all (w, z) such that
1Tmw = 0,1
T
nz = 0, we have that w
TDz = 0. Then (5) follows directly from (4).
3.2 Determining if a Matrix is inMm×n(R)
Another crucial step in our approach is to determine whether the matrices A˜, B˜,D are in
Mm×n(R). We present here an informal method for determining this, while leaving the full
statement of the relevant propositions to Appendix C.
Informal Statement of Theorem (17). Given F ∈ Rm×n, select any (i, j) ∈ {1 . . .m} ×
{1 . . . n} and let
F¯ = 1mF(i) + (F
(j) − 1mfi,j)1Tn . (6)
Then, F = F¯ iff F ∈Mm×n(R).
We present a short outline of the proof here. First-off, we have F¯ ∈Mm×n(R). Secondly,
if F ∈Mm×n(R), then F¯ represents a valid decomposition of F as
F¯ = 1mF(i) + (F
(j) − 1mfi,j)1Tn ,
= 1m(u
T + 1Tnvi) + (v − 1mvi)1Tn ,
= 1mu
T + v1Tn .
So, if F ∈Mm×n(R), F¯ is a valid decomposition, and F = F¯ .
3.3 A Decomposition of D
We now informally state our first main result on calculating the equivalent zero-sum game
(m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ).
Informal Statement of Theorem (14). Suppose that (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent
to a zero-sum game (m,n,A,−A) through a PAT with A˜, B˜ /∈Mm×n(R). Define D by (4)
and assume rank(D) = 2. Select any (i, j) ∈ {1 . . .m} × {1 . . . n}, let Aˆ = γA˜ − 1mD(i)
and Bˆ = B˜ − (D(j) − 1mdi,j)1Tn . Then, Aˆ = −Bˆ and the bimatrix game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is
strategically equivalent to the zero-sum game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ).
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The full statement and formal proof of Theorem 14 is given in Appendix B.1. Then
Corollary 17.1 in Appendix C connects Theorem 14 to the computationally efficient decom-
position of D presented above.
For an informal argument to support the claim above, we have that for any D ∈
Mm×n(R) with rank(D) = 2 we can write
D = 1m(u
T + 1Tnvi) + (v − 1mvi)1Tn ,
= 1mD(i) + (D
(j) − 1mdi,j)1Tn .
Then (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) by Lemma 1 and
Aˆ+ Bˆ = γA˜+ B˜ − 1mD(i) − (D(j) − 1mdi,j)1Tn ,
= D −D = 0m×n
While the procedure presented above applies to rank(D) = 2, for completeness one
still needs to consider the cases of rank(D) < 2. These cases are straightforward and are
presented in Theorem 15 in Appendix B.2.
3.4 A Simple Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors
Consider the game matrix given in Figure 1a and let us represent this game as (m,n,A,−A).
This is the classic Rock-Paper-Scissors with well known NE strategies p∗ = q∗ = [13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ]
T.
The game in Figure 1b is a positive affine transformation of (m,n,A,−A). Let us represent
this game as (m,n, A˜, B˜). Clearly, (m,n, A˜, B˜) is neither zero-sum nor constant-sum. How-
ever, by applying the process outlined above one can obtain the game in Figure 1c, which
is a zero-sum game and strategically equivalent to (m,n, A˜, B˜).
R P S
R 0, 0 −1, 1 1,−1
P 1,−1 0, 0 −1, 1
S −1, 1 1,−1 0, 0
(a) Rock-Paper-Scissors
R P S
R −1, 9 6, 13 2, 5
P 1,−1 8, 3 −2, 7
S −3, 14 10, 6 0, 10
(b) A PAT of Rock-Paper-Scissors
R P S
R −9, 9 −13, 13 −5, 5
P −5, 5 −9, 9 −13, 13
S −13, 13 −5, 5 −9, 9
(c) Zero-Sum Game equivalent to (b)
Figure 1: (a) The classic zero-sum game Rock-Paper-Scissors. (b) A nonzero-sum game that
is strategically equivalent to Rock-Paper-Scissors through a PAT. (c) A zero-sum game that
is strategically equivalent to the PAT of Rock-Paper-Scissors.
By letting w = [−1, 1, 0]T, z = [−1, 0, 1]T and applying (5) we have that
γ = −w
TB˜z
wTA˜z
= − 12−6 = 2.
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Then we apply Theorem 14 with (i, j) = (1, 1) to obtain the strategically zero-sum game:
Aˆ = 2A˜− 1m
[
7 25 9
]
,
Bˆ = B˜ −
 0−6
1
1Tn .
The result of these calculations is the zero-sum game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) which is displayed in
Figure 1c and, as expected, has the NE strategies p∗ = q∗ = [13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ]
T.
4 Algorithm for Strategically Equivalent Rank-0 Games (SER0)
We have shown that given the game (m,n, A˜, B˜), one can determine if the game is strate-
gically equivalent to the game (m,n,A,−A) through a PAT. If so, then it is possible to
construct a rank-0 game which is strategically equivalent to the original game. One can
then efficiently solve the strategically equivalent zero-sum game via linear programming.
We state the key steps in our algorithm below and show that both the determination of
strategic equivalence and the computation of the strategically equivalent zero-sum game
can be done in time O(mn).
The analytical results and discussions throughout this paper apply to real bimatrix
games, with (m,n, A˜, B˜) ∈ Rm×n × Rm×n. However, for computational reasons, when
discussing the algorithmic implementations we focus on rational bimatrix games, with
(m,n, A˜, B˜) ∈ Qm×n × Qm×n.
We present here a shortened version of the SER0 algorithm that applies when rank(D) =
2. The cases of rank(D) < 2 are similar, but add complexity to the presentation. As such,
the full algorithms and more detailed analysis are deferred to Appendix D.
Informal Statement of Theorem (19). The SER0 algorithm determines if a game
(m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to a rank-0 game and returns the strategically equiv-
alent zero-sum game in time O(mn).
Here we give the analysis of ShortSER0 presented in Algorithm 1.
First-off, testing whether a matrix is in Mm×n(Q) is equivalent to implementing (6)
and then comparing two matrices. Both these operations take time O(mn). Next, for any
matrix F ∈ Qm×n calculating wTFz takes time O(m2) + O(n) < O(mn) for m ≤ n. So,
calculating γ can be done in time O(mn) if one has candidate vectors (w, z). Corollary 17.2
in Appendix C gives an algorithm for determining such (w, z) that runs in time O(mn).
Forming the D matrix takes mn multiplications and mn additions, and therefore has
time O(mn). Finally, calculating Aˆ, Bˆ for the case rank(D) = 2 consists of scalar-matrix
multiplication, vector outer product, and matrix subtraction. Therefore, it has time O(mn).
This shows that overall the algorithm can both identify whether a game is strategically
equivalent to a zero-sum game through a PAT and, if so, can determine the equivalent game
in time O(mn).
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Algorithm 1 Condensed algorithm for solving a strategically rank-0 game
1: procedure ShortSER0(A˜, B˜)
2: if A˜ and/or B˜ ∈Mm×n(Q) then
3: Calculate pure strategy NE and exit
4: else
5: γ ← −wTB˜z
wTA˜z
6: if γ < 0 then
7: Not strategically equivalent via PAT. exit
8: else
9: D ← B˜ + γA˜
10: if D not in Mm×n(Q) then
11: Not strategically equivalent via PAT. exit
12: else
13: choose (i, j) ∈ (m× n)
14: Aˆ← γA˜− 1mD(i)
15: Bˆ ← B˜ − (D(j) − 1mdi,j)1Tn
16: Solve (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) via LP
17: end if
18: end if
19: end if
20: end procedure
5 Further Discussions
Typically, a general bimatrix game may admit a set of multiple Nash equilibria that are
disconnected. However, one of the well-known results in game theory is that the set of NE
of a zero-sum game is a convex set in ∆m × ∆n. As a result, we immediately have the
following result.
Corollary 4.1 ([12, Corollary 1]). If a bimatrix game (m,n, A˜, B˜) satisfies Assumption 3,
then the set of Nash equilibria Φ(A˜, B˜) is a compact convex subset of ∆m×∆n. In addition,
the bimatrix game also has the ordered interchangeability property.
For another example, typically fictitious play is not guaranteed to converge in nonzero-
sum games with n,m > 2. However, it is well known that fictitious play converges in
zero-sum games [25]. Therefore, we have:
Corollary 4.2 ([12, Corollary 3]). If a bimatrix game (m,n, A˜, B˜) satisfies Assumption 3,
then fictitious play converges.
As a third immediate result, consider the class of strictly competitive games, which are
a subclass of strategically zero-sum games. As characterized in [21], a game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is
strictly competitive iff for some α > 0 and β ∈ R, B˜ = −αA+ β1m1Tn . Then, the following
result directly follows from Theorems 15 and 19.
Corollary 4.3. The SER0 algorithm determines whether a game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strictly
competitive in time O(mn).
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6 Numerical Results
To evaluate the performance of the SER0 algorithm we ran several sets of experiments.
For each experiment, we generated square games of size m = n, with n ∈ [500, 10000] and
uniformly distributed payoff values in the game matrices. For each value of n, we ran SER0
on 10 different game instances.
All experiments were conducted on a standard desktop computer running Windows 7
with 16GB of RAM and an Intel Xeon E5-1603 processor with 4 cores running at 2.8GHz.
For our first set of experiments, for each value of n we created instances (m,n, A˜, B˜) that
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Figure 2: Average running time and standard deviation of the SER0 algorithm for strate-
gically equivalent games, games that are not strategically equivalent, and games that are
guaranteed to have at least one pure strategy NE. For each value ofmn, we ran the algorithm
on 10 such games.
were strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game (m,n,A,−A). In all cases tested, the
SER0 algorithm correctly identified the games as strategically zero-sum and calculated the
equivalent game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ). As expected, one can observe from Figure 2 that for this set
of experiments there is a clear linear relationship between the runtime of SER0 and the size
of the game instance. In addition, for very large games of size (10000× 10000) SER0 found
the equivalent game in an average time of 3.6 seconds.
For the next set of experiments we created games which were guaranteed to have a pure
strategy NE. In other words, at least one of A˜ or B˜ were in Mm×n(Q). Again, the SER0
algorithm correctly identified all of these cases as having a pure strategy NE. Similar to the
first set of experiments, we observe that SER0’s runtime is linear in this case. As expected,
this case is much faster than the strategically equivalent case as there is no need to calculate
Aˆ, Bˆ,D nor test for D ∈Mm×n(Q).
Finally, we conducted experiments on games that were not strategically equivalent to a
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zero-sum game via a PAT. Similar to the other two sets of experiments, the SER0 algorithm
correctly identified these games as not strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game. As
Figure 2 shows, this case also exhibits a linear relationship between runtime and the game
size, although with a much higher standard deviation compared to the other two sets of
experiments. This higher standard deviation is readily explainable by examining the SER0
algorithm. When testing whether or not a game is strategically equivalent, the test can
return a negative result if either γ ≤ 0 or D /∈Mm×n(Q). For cases of γ ≤ 0, the algorithm
terminates and returns a negative result in much less time than it takes to calculate the D
matrix and test for D ∈Mm×n(Q).
7 Conclusion
In this work we’ve presented an algorithm, the SER0 algorithm, that for a bimatrix game
determines in linear time whether the game either has a guaranteed pure strategy Nash
equilibrium or is strategically equivalent to some zero-sum game. In the latter case, the
algorithm also finds the strategically equivalent zero-sum game in linear time. This strategi-
cally equivalent game can then be solved efficiently via linear programming, and this solution
provides a NE strategy of the original game. This represents a significant computational
advantage compared to prior work on computing strategically equivalent zero-sum games.
In comparison to mutually concave games, the SER0 algorithm recognizes an equivalent
game in a computationally efficient manner, then can solve the game with a linear program
instead of a convex quadratic program. Thus, our algorithm substantially expands the class
of nonzero-sum games for which a computationally efficient (polynomial time) algorithm
for computing Nash equilibrium is known.
One interesting direction for future research would be to explore the relationship, if
there is one, between (weakly) unilaterally competitive games and strategically zero-sum
games. In regards to algorithmic game theory, one main challenge to address is whether
or not there exists a polynomial time algorithm that could identify strategically equivalent
rank-k games. Another interesting extension would be to develop an algorithm to compute
approximate NE based on “almost” strategically zero-sum games.
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A Results From Linear Algebra
In this section, we collect some preliminary results from linear algebra that are used through-
out the rest of the paper to prove the main result. The first subsection describes the
Wedderburn rank reduction formula, which presents a method to reduce the rank of a ma-
trix through a simple decomposition technique. The second subsection discusses certain
properties of the vector space Mm×n that are used later in the proofs.
A.1 Wedderburn Rank Reduction Formula
Theorem 5 ([26, p. 69] [27]). Let C ∈ Rm×n be an arbitrary matrix, not identically zero.
Then, there exists vectors x1 ∈ Rn and y1 ∈ Rm such that w1 = yT1Cx1 6= 0. Then, setting
C = C1 for convenience, the matrix
C2 := C1 − w−11 C1x1yT1C1 (7)
has rank exactly one less than the rank of C.
Proof. The original proof of (7) is due to Wedderburn [26, p. 69]. We restate it here for
completeness.
We first show that the null space of C2 contains the null space of C1. Pick z such that
C1z = 0. Then,
C2z = C1z− w−11 C1x1yT1C1z = 0.
Thus, z is in the null space of C2, which implies that the null space of C2 contains the null
space of C1.
Next, we show that x1 is in the null space of C2, thereby showing that the dimension of
the null space of C2 is one more than the dimension of the null space of C1 (since C1x1 6= 0).
Consider
C2x1 = C1x1 − w−11 C1x1yT1C1x1 = 0.
Thus, the rank of C2 is one less than the rank of C1.
We now have the following theorem that applies Wedderburn rank reduction formula to
compute a decomposition of the matrix.
Theorem 6 (Rank-Reducing Process [26, p. 69] [27]). Let C ∈ Rm×n. If rank(C) = γ,
then there exists xk ∈ Rn, yk ∈ Rm, k = 1, . . . , γ such that wk = yTkCkxk 6= 0 and the
following holds:
Ck+1 = Ck − w−1k CkxkyTkCk k = (1, 2, . . . , γ) (8)
where C1 = C, Cγ+1 = 0, and rank(Ck+1) = rank(Ck) − 1. In addition, let Wk =
w−1k Ckxky
T
kCk, where rank(Wk) = 1. Then, we have
C =
γ∑
k=1
Wk. (9)
Proof. Apply Theorem 5 to C for γ + 1 iterations.
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A.2 The SubspaceMm×n(R)
In this subsection, we recall an essential fact from linear algebra, state an interesting corol-
lary of Theorem 6, and introduce the the subspace Mm×n(R), which we define as
Mm×n(R) =
{
M ∈ Rm×n|M = 1muT + v1Tn
}
.
The properties of this subspace are essential to formulating the algorithmic solution to our
problem as the matrix D that we are searching for must lie in this subspace.
Let us begin by stating an essential fact on the rank-1 decomposition of a matrix.
Fact 1. For any matrix M ∈ Rm×n with rank(M) = r, one can write M as a summation of
r rank-1 matrices, M =
∑r
1 viu
T
i . Furthermore, [v1,v2, . . . ,vr] is a basis for ColSpan(M)
and [u1,u2, . . . ,ur] is a basis for ColSpan(M
T).
Corollary 6.1. For a matrix M ∈ Rm×n with rank(M) = r, let {Wk} for k ∈ {1, . . . , r} be
a set of rank-1 matrices derived from the rank-reducing process in Theorem 6. Let M1 = M ,
and Mk+1 be as defined in (8). Let vku
T
k = Wk = w
−1
k Mkxky
T
kMk. Then vk /∈ ColSpan(Mj)
and uk /∈ ColSpan(MTj ) for all j > k.
Proof. By recursively applying (8) from Theorem 6, we can write Mk+1 as
Mk+1 = M −
k∑
i=1
Wi.
Then, combined with (9) we have
Mk+1 =
r∑
i=1
Wi −
k∑
i=1
Wi (10)
Mk+1 =
r∑
i=k+1
Wi (11)
From (10) and Fact 1, it is apparent that the basis for ColSpan(Mk+1) is formed by removing
[v1,v2, . . . ,vk] from the basis of ColSpan(M). Then, since by definition the basis vectors
are linearly independent, there is no linear combination of [vj ,vj+1, . . . ,vr], such that the
linear combination equals vk for j > k. Therefore, vk /∈ ColSpan(Mj) and for all j > k.
The same argument holds for uk /∈ ColSpan(MTj ) for all j > k.
We now proceed to prove that Mm×n(R) is indeed a subspace of the vector space of all
real matrices. Following that, we state some essential properties of the subspace that will
be used throughout the presentation in Appendix B.
Lemma 7. Let Vm×n(R) be the vector space of real m × n matrices and Mm×n(R) be the
space of real matrices such that for all M ∈Mm×n(R), M = 1muT+v1Tn . Then Mm×n(R)
is a subspace of Vm×n(R).
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Proof. We show thatMm×n(R) meets the three properties of a subspace of a vector space.
First, consider u = 0n,v = 0m. Then, M = 0m×n and the zero vector is in Mm×n(R).
Secondly, for all M1,M2 ∈Mm×n(R),
M1 +M2 = 1mu
T + v1Tn + 1mu
T
2 + v21
T
n ,
= 1m(u
T + uT2 ) + (v + v2)1
T
n .
Therefore, M1 + M2 ∈ Mm×n(R). Finally, for all c ∈ R and M ∈ Mm×n(R), cM =
1mcu
T + cv1Tn ∈Mm×n(R).
Lemma 8. For any matrix M ∈ Rm×n with M 6= 0m×n there is at least one nonzero column
and one nonzero row. Let M (j) and M(i) denote such a column and row. Then, with x = ej
and y = ei we have that 1
T
nx 6= 0, 1Tmy 6= 0, Mx = M (j) 6= 0m, and yTM = M(i) 6= 0Tn .
Proof. The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Lemma 9. For any matrix M ∈Mm×n(R):
1. If rank(M) = 2, then 1m ∈ ColSpan(M) and 1n ∈ ColSpan(MT). In addition, for
all x,y such that Mx = 1m,M
Ty = 1n,1
T
nx = 0,1
T
my = 0.
2. If rank(M) = 1, then either 1m ∈ ColSpan(M), or 1n ∈ ColSpan(MT) or both
1m ∈ ColSpan(M) and 1n ∈ ColSpan(MT).
Proof. For claim 1, 1m ∈ ColSpan(M) and 1n ∈ ColSpan(MT) follows directly from
rank(M) = 2 and Fact 1. In addition, M ∈ Mm×n(R) and rank(M) = 2 implies that
there exists v 6= 0n and u 6= 0m such that M = 1muT + v1Tn . Also from Fact 1 and
rank(M) = 2, we have that for all a ∈ R, v 6= a1m since v and 1m must be linearly
independent. Then, for all x such that Mx = 1m we have that:
Mx = 1mu
Tx + v1Tnx = 1m,
= (uTx)1m + (1
T
nx)v = 1m,
=⇒ (1Tnx)v = (1− uTx)1m.
v 6= a1m implies that the equation above is satisfied if and only if 1Tnx = 0 and uTx = 1.
To prove that for all y such that MTy = 1n, 1
T
my = 0 apply the same technique to M
T.
Claim 2 follows directly from rank(M) = 1 and Fact 1.
In the next lemma, we show that if there is a row and a column of a matrix in the
subspaceMm×n(R) with all zero entries, then the matrix itself is a zero matrix. This result
is used later to devise an efficient algorithm to check whether or not a matrix lies in the
space Mm×n(R).
Lemma 10. For any matrix F ∈ Rm×n, if there exists i, j such that F(i) = 0Tn and F (j) = 0m
then F ∈Mm×n(R) if and only if F = 0m×n.
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Proof. Clearly F = 0m×n implies that F ∈ Mm×n(R) and that for all i, j F(i) = 0Tn and
F (j) = 0m. Now, consider the forward direction and suppose that F ∈ Mm×n(R). Then
from the definition ofMm×n(R), we have that rank(F ) ≤ 2. We will show that rank(F ) = 0.
F(i) = 0
T
n implies that 1m /∈ ColSpan(M) and F (j) = 0m implies that 1n /∈ ColSpan(MT).
Then, by Lemma 9 rank(F ) 6= 1, 2. Therefore, rank(F ) = 0 and F = 0m×n.
For a matrix A ∈ Rm×n, let us define the set WZ(A) as
WZ(A) =
{
(w, z) ∈ Rm × Rn | wTAz 6= 0,1Tmw = 0,1Tnz = 0
}
.
Lemma 11. Pick a matrix A ∈ Rm×n. If A /∈Mm×n(R), then the setWZ(A) is nonempty.
Proof. We show the proof by constructing appropriate vectors z and w such that wTAz 6= 0.
First-off, we note that for any M = 1mu0
T+v01
T
n ∈Mm×n(R) and z ∈
{
z ∈ Rn | 1Tnz = 0
}
,
w ∈ {w ∈ Rm | 1Tmw = 0} we have that wTMz = 0.
We first consider the case where A has a decomposition such that, for some M ∈
Mm×n(R), v1 ∈ Rn, and u1 ∈ Rm, we can write A = M + v1uT1 . Recall that since
A /∈ Mm×n(R), we get v1 /∈ ColSpan(M),u1 /∈ ColSpan(MT) with u1 6= 0m and v1 6= 0n.
We then extend the proof to the more general case. Constructing the orthogonal projection
of u1 onto 1m and v1 onto 1n we let
w = v1 − v
T
1 1m
1Tm1m
1m,
z = u1 − u
T
1 1n
1Tn1n
1n.
Then, as desired, we have that
1Tmw = 1
T
mv1 − vT1 1m
1Tm1m
1Tm1m
= 0,
1Tnz = 1
T
nu1 − uT1 1n
1Tn1n
1Tn1n
= 0.
In addition, since v1 is not a scalar multiple of 1m and u1 is not a scalar multiple of 1n,
we use Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to get (both the inequalities are strictly positive)
wTv1 = v
T
1 v1 −
(vT1 1m)
2
1Tm1m
6= 0,
uT1 z = u
T
1 u1 −
(uT1 1n)
2
1Tn1n
6= 0.
Then,
wTAz = wTMz + wTv1u
T
1 z = w
Tv1u
T
1 z 6= 0.
We now proceed to the more general case. For any A ∈ Rm×n, A /∈ Mm×n(R) and
M = 1mu0
T + v01
T
n ∈ Mm×n(R), we can write A as A = M +
∑k
i=1 viu
T
i where vi /∈
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ColSpan(M),ui /∈ ColSpan(MT) for all i, rank(M) ≤ 2, k = rank(A)−rank(M), v1, . . . ,vk
are linearly independent vectors, and u1, . . . ,uk are linearly independent vectors. Note, that
since rank(M) ≤ 2, we may have u0 = 0n and/or v0 = 0m.
Let w0 = 1m and z0 = 1n and construct a set of orthogonal vectors such that
wi = vi −
i∑
j=0
vTi wj
wTj wj
wj ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
zi = ui −
i∑
j=0
uTi zj
zTj zj
zj ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
1Tmwi = 0 1
T
nzi = 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
wTi vj = 0 u
T
j zi = 0 ∀j < i
wTi vi 6= 0 uTi zi 6= 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
(12)
Then, letting i = k, we have that
wTkAzk = w
T
kMzk + w
T
k
k∑
i=1
viu
T
i zk,
= wTkMzk + w
T
k
k−1∑
i=1
viu
T
i zk + w
T
kvku
T
k zk,
= wTkvku
T
k zk 6= 0.
Thus wk and vk as defined in (12) are one possible pair of vectors such that w
T
kAzk 6= 0
and the proof is complete.
B Strategic Equivalence between Bimatrix Games and Zero-Sum Games
In this section, we present the proofs of our main results. First, we have the following
results.
Lemma 12. If (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to (m,n,A,−A) through a positive
affine transformation then A˜, B˜ ∈Mm×n(R) if and only if A ∈Mm×n(R).
Proof. Follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 7.
Proposition 13. If (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to (m,n,A,−A) through a PAT
and A˜, B˜ /∈Mm×n(R), then ∀(w, z) ∈ WZ(A˜) we have that
wTA˜z 6= 0, (13)
wTB˜z 6= 0, (14)
wTAz 6= 0, (15)
γ =
α2
α1
= −w
TB˜z
wTA˜z
> 0. (16)
Furthermore, WZ(A˜) =WZ(A) =WZ(B˜).
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Proof. A˜ /∈Mm×n(R) and Lemma 11 implies thatWZ(A˜) is nonempty and (13) holds. We
now claim that (15) holds. Indeed, we have
wTA˜z = α1w
TAz + wT1mu
Tz = α1w
TAz, . (17)
Since α1 is positive, we conclude that (15) holds and WZ(A˜) =WZ(A).
Then by (15), α2 > 0, and
wTB˜z = −α2wTAz + wTv1Tnz = −α2wTAz (18)
we conclude that (14) holds and WZ(B˜) = WZ(A). Finally, from (17), (18), and (15) we
have that
−w
TB˜z
wTA˜z
=
α2w
TAz
α1wTAz
=
α2
α1
= γ,
which establishes the identity in (16).
Thus, what we have shown above is that given a nonzero-sum bimatrix game that we
know is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum bimatrix game, we can easily ascertain that γ
is strictly greater than 0 by picking any (w, z) ∈ WZ(A˜). In the sequel, our results bank on
this observation, wherein we assume the existence of γ > 0 such that B˜ + γA˜ ∈ Mm×n(R)
and proceed to identify a strategically equivalent zero-sum game. For ease of exposition,
we break the result into two theorems–Theorem 14 and Theorem 15–proved in the next two
subsections.
B.1 The case of rank(D) equals 2
Theorem 14. Consider the game (m,n, A˜, B˜), and assume that A˜, B˜ /∈Mm×n(R). If there
exists γ ∈ R>0 such that B˜ + γA˜ = D ∈ Mm×n(R) with rank(D) = 2, then there exists
x1 ∈ Rn and y1 ∈ Rm such that Dx1 = 1m and w1 = yT1Dx1 6= 0. Let uˆT = w−11 yT1D and
compute D2 using (7) as follows:
D2 = D − w−11 Dx1yT1D = D − 1muˆT.
Define Aˆ = γA˜−1muˆT and Bˆ = B˜−D2. Then, Aˆ = −Bˆ and the bimatrix game (m,n, A˜, B˜)
is strategically equivalent to the zero-sum game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ).
Proof. Lemma 9, D ∈ Mm×n(R), and rank(D) = 2 implies that 1m ∈ ColSpan(D), 1n ∈
ColSpan(DT). Therefore, there exists x1 such that Dx1 = 1m. Lemma 8 implies that there
exists y1 ∈ Rm such that yT1D 6= 0n and 1Tmy1 6= 0. Therefore, we have w1 = yT1Dx1 6= 0.
Let w−11 y
T
1D := uˆ
T, then w−11 Dx1y
T
1D = 1muˆ
T. After applying the Wedderburn rank
reduction formula, we have
D2 = D − w−11 Dx1yT1D = D − 1muˆT.
We now proceed to show that D2 = vˆ1
T
n for some vector vˆ. We have that D ∈Mm×n(R)
and 1muˆ
T ∈ Mm×n(R). Then, by Lemma 7, D2 ∈ Mm×n(R). In addition, by Theorem
5, rank(D2) = 1. By Corollary 6.1, we have that 1m /∈ ColSpan(D2). Then Lemma 9,
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D2 ∈ Mm×n(R), rank(D2) = 1, and 1m /∈ ColSpan(D2) implies that D2 = vˆ1Tn for some
vˆ ∈ Rm.
Finally, with Aˆ = γA˜− 1muˆT and Bˆ = B˜ −D2 we have
Aˆ+ Bˆ = B˜ + γA˜− 1muˆT −D2,
= D −D,
= 0m×n.
Therefore, (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) by Lemma 1 and Aˆ+ Bˆ =
0m×n.
While Theorem 14 handles the most general case of rank(D) = 2, for completeness we
still need to consider the cases of rank(D) < 2. The following theorem addresses those
cases.
B.2 The case of rank(D) less than 2
Theorem 15. Given the matrices A˜, B˜ /∈ Mm×n(R), if there exists γ ∈ R>0 such that
B˜ + γA˜ = D ∈Mm×n(R), with rank(D) < 2 then:
1. If rank(D) = 0, Aˆ = γA˜ and Bˆ = B˜.
2. If rank(D) = 1 and 1m ∈ ColSpan(D) then Aˆ = γA˜−D and Bˆ = B˜.
3. If rank(D) = 1 and 1n ∈ ColSpan(DT) then Aˆ = γA˜ and Bˆ = B˜ −D.
Then the bimatrix game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to the zero-sum game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ).
Proof. The proof of case 1 is straightforward and therefore omitted. For case 2, D ∈
Mm×n(R), rank(D) = 1, and 1m ∈ ColSpan(D) implies that D = 1muˆT. Then
Aˆ+ Bˆ = B˜ + γA˜−D,
= D −D,
= 0m×n.
Therefore, (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) by Lemma 1 and Aˆ+ Bˆ =
0m×n. The proof of case 3 is similar to the proof of case 2 and therefore omitted.
We note here that cases 2 and 3 above subsume the more commonly studied constant-
sum game.
Theorems 14 and 15 only apply to determining strategic equivalence when A˜, B˜ /∈
Mm×n(R). That leaves open the question of strategic equivalence when either game matrix
lies in Mm×n(R). The following proposition shows that, regardless of strategic equiva-
lence, a pure strategy NE is guaranteed to exist if either payoff matrix in the game lies
in Mm×n(R). It is then trivial to calculate such a pure strategy NE. We note here that,
although arrived at in a different manner, our Proposition 16 is equivalent to [23, Proposi-
tion 7] for A˜, B˜ ∈Mm×n(R). However, the further assertion that the proposition holds for
either A˜ ∈Mm×n(R) or B˜ ∈Mm×n(R) is not made by the authors of [23].
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B.3 Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Proposition 16. If A˜ ∈Mm×n(R) and/or B˜ ∈Mm×n(R) then the game (m,n, A˜, B˜) has
a pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. We first consider the case of A˜, B˜ ∈ Mm×n(R). For all A˜, B˜ ∈ Mm×n(R), we can
write A˜ and B˜ as:
A˜ = 1mu
T
1 + v11
T
n ,
B˜ = 1mu
T
2 + v21
T
n .
Letting
V = v11
T
n =

v1 v1 . . . v1
v2 v2 . . . v2
...
...
. . .
...
vm vm . . . vm
 , U = 1muT2 =

u1 u2 . . . un
u1 u2 . . . un
...
...
. . .
...
u1 u2 . . . un
 .
Then, writing A˜ = V + 1mu
T
1 and B˜ = U + v21
T
n it is clear by Lemma 1 that the game
(m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to the game (m,n, V, U). The game (m,n, V, U)
has a trivial pure strategy NE where player 1 plays i ∈ argmaxi∈S1 v1 and player 2 plays
j ∈ argmaxj∈S2 u2.
We now consider the case of A˜ ∈Mm×n(R), B˜ /∈Mm×n(R). Using the same argument
as above, the game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to the game (m,n, V, B˜). The
game (m,n, V, B˜) has a pure strategy equilibrium, wherein player 1 plays i ∈ argmaxi∈S1 v1
and player 2 plays j ∈ argmaxj∈S2 B˜i.
The procedure for deriving an equivalent zero-sum game in Theorem 14 requires us to
check that certain matrix D := B˜ + γA˜ lies in the subspace Mm×n(R). We devise an
efficient algorithm to do this in the next section.
C Checking if a Matrix is inMm×n(R)
In this appendix, we discuss efficient methods for determining if a matrix F is inMm×n(R),
an efficient method for implementing Theorem 14, and for F /∈ Mm×n(R) a procedure for
finding a (w, z) ∈ WZ(F ).
The application of the Wedderburn rank reduction formula in Theorem 14 is relatively
efficient, other than solving for Dx1 = 1m. In the discussion that follows, we will show
that:
1. There is no need to explicitly solve Dx1 = 1m.
2. The matricesD2 and 1muˆ
T can be calculated through only matrix addition/subtraction.
3. Theorem 14 also provides an efficient method for determining whether or not any
matrix F is in Mm×n(R).
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First-off, suppose that D ∈Mm×n(R) and rank(D) = 2. Therefore, we know that there
exists a vector x1 such that Dx1 = 1m. Examining Theorem 14, we see that the term x1
always appears as a term in the matrix-vector product Dx1. Therefore, we can replace all
appearances of the term Dx1 with 1m and there is no need to explicitly calculate x1.
One feasible, but naive, way to select y1 is to simply choose a random vector in R
m such
that 1Tmy1 6= 0. A more algorithmic efficient manner is to let y1 = ei for some i. Then we
have that:
w−11 =
1
yT1Dx1
=
1
eTi 1m
= 1.
Then, we also have:
1muˆ
T = w−11 Dx1y
T
1D
= 1me
T
i D
= 1mu
T + 1m1
T
nvi
=

D(i)
D(i)
...
D(i)
 .
In other words, we can form 1muˆ
T directly by replicating any nonzero row of D.
Now, we note that for D2 we have that:
D2 = D − w−11 Dx1yT1D = D − 1muT − 1m1Tnvi
= 1mu
T + v1Tn − 1muT − 1m1Tnvi
= (v − 1mvi)1Tn
=

v1 − vi v1 − vi . . . v1 − vi
v2 − vi v2 − vi . . . v2 − vi
...
...
. . .
...
vm − vi vm − vi . . . vm − vi
 . (19)
From the equation above, it appears that one requires the entire D matrix in order to form
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D2. Here, we show that it is possible to construct D2 using just one column of D. Consider
D =

u1 + v1 u2 + v1 . . . un + v1
u1 + v2 u2 + v2 . . . un + v2
...
...
. . .
...
u1 + vm u2 + vm . . . un + vm
 ,
D(j) =

uj + v1
uj + v2
...
uj + vm
 ,
D(j) − 1mdi,j =

uj + v1
uj + v2
...
uj + vm
− 1m(uj + vi) =

v1 − vi
v2 − vi
...
vm − vi
 . (20)
Comparing the vector expression for D(j) − 1mdi,j in (20) to the matrix form of D2
in (19), it is clear that for any chosen i ∈ {1 . . .m} and for all j ∈ {1 . . . n}, we have
D
(j)
2 = D
(j) − 1mdi,j . Therefore, we can form D2 directly from D as
D2 =
[
D(j)|D(j)|. . . |D(j)]− 1m1Tndi,j .
In other words, pick a column j of D, subtract di,j from every element in the column, then
replicate the resulting vector n times to form D2. Therefore, the matrices D2 and 1muˆ
T
can be calculated through only matrix addition and subtraction.
In the previous discussion, we assumed that D ∈ Mm×n(R) and rank(D) = 2. In the
next proposition, we show that using a similar process as above it is possible to determine
if any matrix F ∈ Rm×n is in Mm×n(R).
Theorem 17. Given a matrix F ∈ Rm×n, select any row i of F and any column j of F
and construct the matrices:
R =

F(i)
F(i)
...
F(i)
 , C = [F (j)|F (j)|. . . |F (j)]− 1m1Tnfi,j .
and let
Fˆ := F −R− C. (21)
Then F is in Mm×n(R) if and only if Fˆ = 0m×n.
Proof. First, we note that R = 1mF(i) ∈Mm×n(R) and C = (F (j)−1mfi,j)1Tn ∈Mm×n(R).
Then by Lemma 7 and (21) we have F ∈ Mm×n(R) if and only if Fˆ ∈ Mm×n(R). We will
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show that Fˆ is in Mm×n(R) if and only if Fˆ = 0m×n. We have that:
Fˆ = F −R− C
=

f1,1 − fi,1 − f1,j + fi,j f1,2 − fi,2 − f1,j + fi,j . . . f1,n − fi,n − f1,j + fi,j
f2,1 − fi,1 − f2,j + fi,j f2,2 − fi,2 − f2,j + fi,j . . . f2,n − fi,n − f2,j + fi,j
...
...
. . .
...
fm,1 − fi,1 − fm,j + fi,j fm,2 − fi,2 − fm,j + fi,j . . . fm,n − fi,n − fm,j + fi,j
 .
In this form, it is clear that Fˆ(i) = 0
T
n and Fˆ
(j) = 0m. For example, if (i, j) = (1, 2), then
Fˆ =

f1,1 − f1,1 − f1,2 + f1,2 f1,2 − f1,2 − f1,2 + f1,2 . . . f1,n − f1,n − f1,2 + f1,2
f2,1 − f1,1 − f2,2 + f1,2 f2,2 − f1,2 − f2,2 + f1,2 . . . f2,n − f1,n − f2,2 + f1,2
...
...
. . .
...
fm,1 − f1,1 − fm,2 + f1,2 fm,2 − f1,2 − fm,2 + f1,2 . . . fm,n − f1,n − fm,2 + f1,2

=

0 0 . . . 0
f2,1 − f1,1 − f2,2 + f1,2 0 . . . f2,n − f1,n − f2,2 + f1,2
...
...
. . .
...
fm,1 − f1,1 − fm,2 + f1,2 0 . . . fm,n − f1,n − fm,2 + f1,2
 .
Since Fˆ(i) = 0
T
n and Fˆ
(j) = 0m, from Lemma 10 Fˆ is in Mm×n(R) if and only if Fˆ =
0m×n.
Now, combining Theorem 17 above and the discussion at the beginning of the section,
the next corollary shows that it is possible to use the same algorithm for both testing
whether D ∈Mm×n(R) and to perform one step of the Wedderburn rank-reducing process.
Effectively, this corollary shows that it is possible to implement Theorem 14 in an efficient
manner.
Corollary 17.1. Given matrix D ∈ Rm×n select any row i of D and any column j of D
and construct the matrices:
Wˆ =

D(i)
D(i)
...
D(i)
 ,
Dˆ2 =
[
D(j)|D(j)|. . . |D(j)]− 1m1Tndi,j .
If Dˆ := D − Wˆ − Dˆ2 = 0m×n, then D is in Mm×n(R), 1muˆT = Wˆ , and D2 = Dˆ2.
Proof. The corollary follows directly from Theorem 17 and the fact that Wˆ , Dˆ2 were con-
structed in accordance with Theorem 14.
We now turn our attention to an efficient manner to calculate z ∈ {z ∈ Rn | 1Tnz = 0}
and w ∈ {w ∈ Rm | 1Tmw = 0} in order to compute a candidate parameter γ as per
Proposition 13. The proof of Lemma 11 gives one possible construction of such a z and w.
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However, that construction is too computationally intensive for our application here. In
contrast, the next corollary shows a computationally efficient manner for computing z and
w for F /∈Mm×n(R).
Corollary 17.2. Given matrix F ∈ Rm×n construct Fˆ as in Theorem 17. If Fˆ 6= 0m×n,
choose any (l, k) such that fˆl,k 6= 0, let w = el − ei, and z = ek − ej. Then z ∈
{
z ∈ Rn |
1Tnz = 0
}
, w ∈ {w ∈ Rm | 1Tmw = 0}, and
wTFz = wTFˆz = fˆl,k 6= 0.
Proof. Clearly w and z are constructed such that z ∈ {z ∈ Rn | 1Tnz = 0}, w ∈ {w ∈ Rm |
1Tmw = 0
}
. From Theorem 17 we have that:
Fˆ = F −R− C
= F − 1mF(i) − (F (j) − 1mfi,j)1Tn .
Then we have:
wTFˆz = wTFz−wT1mF(i)z−wT(F (j) − 1mfi,j)1Tnz
= wTFz.
Since Fˆ was constructed such that Fˆ(i) = 0
T
n and Fˆ
(j) = 0m, we have that:
wTFˆz = (el − ei)TFˆ (ek − ej)
= (el − ei)T(Fˆek − Fˆej)
= (el − ei)T(Fˆek − 0m)
= eTl Fˆek − eTi Fˆek
= eTl Fˆek − 0Tnek
= eTl Fˆek
= fˆl,k.
Finally, fˆl,k was selected such that fˆl,k 6= 0. This completes the proof.
We now study the time complexity of SER0 algorithm in the next section.
D Time Complexity of the SER0 algorithm
We have shown that given the game (m,n, A˜, B˜), one can determine if the game is strate-
gically equivalent to the game (m,n,A,−A) through a PAT. If so, then it is possible to
construct a rank-0 game which is strategically equivalent to the original game. One can
then efficiently solve the strategically equivalent zero-sum game via linear programming.
We state the key steps in our algorithm below and show that both the determination of
strategic equivalence and the computation of the strategically equivalent zero-sum game
can be computed in time O(mn).
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The results and discussions in the previous sections of this paper apply to real bimatrix
games, with (m,n, A˜, B˜) ∈ Rm×n × Rm×n. However, for computational reasons we now
focus on rational bimatrix games, with (m,n, A˜, B˜) ∈ Qm×n × Qm×n.
The most computationally extensive portion of our algorithm is the function for deter-
mining whether a given matrix F is inMm×n(Q). Therefore, we will first focus on describing
that algorithm and analyzing its computational complexity.
The function IsMatrixInM in Algorithm 2 takes as input a matrix F ∈ Qm×n and
an option∈ {1, 2}. For both options, it returns whether or not F is in Mm×n(Q). If
option= 1, then it is an implementation of Corollary 17.2 and also returns (α, l, k) where
(l, k) is the index of the first nonzero element found in Fˆ and α = fˆl,k. We note here that
if F ∈Mm×n(Q) then (α, l, k) = (0,m, n).
If option= 2, IsMatrixInM is an implementation of Corollary 17.1. As such, if F ∈
Mm×n(Q) it also returns (R,C) = (W,D2).
The algorithm first identifies a nonzero row and column of the input matrix F . It then
proceeds to formulate the R,C and Fˆ matrices as described in Theorem 17. Finally, it
searches over Fˆ for the first nonzero element. If a nonzero element is found, it marks the
matrix as not inMm×n(Q) and sets α equal to that element. If no nonzero element is found,
then it marks the matrix as in Mm×n(Q). Finally, the proper variables are returned based
on the option selected.
Proposition 18. The IsMatrixInM algorithm terminates in time O(mn).
Proof. Forming the R matrix requires m iterations of copying a vector of length n, for time
O(mn). Similarly, forming the C matrix requires n iterations with one subtraction of a
vector of length m and one assignment of an n length vector per iteration, for a total time
of O(mn). Finally, the nested for loops in lines 11 to 22 search an m × n matrix for the
first nonzero element, with a worst case running time of O(mn) if Fˆ = 0m×n. Therefore,
the overall running time of the algorithm is O(mn).
We now turn our attention to describing and analyzing the StratZeroSum function
from Algorithm 3. The StratZeroSum function accepts as input two game matrices
(A˜, B˜) ∈ Qm×n × Qm×n. It returns whether or not the game is guaranteed to have a pure
strategy NE, whether or not the game is strategically equivalent to a nonzero-sum game,
and the equivalent game matrices.
The function first checks whether (A˜, B˜) ∈ Mm×n(Q). If either is true, it marks that
the game always has a pure strategy and returns the original game matrices. Otherwise,
it compares the indices returned by IsMatrixInM. If those indices don’t match, then
the conditions for Proposition 13 are not met, we mark that the game is not strategically
equivalent to a nonzero-sum game and the algorithm terminates. Here we note that since
IsMatrixInM returns the first nonzero element encountered, testing for equality in the
indices is equivalent to testing wB˜z 6= 0 for w = el1 − ei1 , z = ek1 − ej1 .
Otherwise, we test for γ ≤ 0. If γ ≤ 0 then the conditions for Theorem 14 are not
met, we mark that the game is not strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game via a PAT
and the algorithm terminates. If γ > 0, the algorithm continues by calculating D and then
lines 15 through 23 implement 15. We note here that determining if D = 0m×n, if D has
constant columns (repeated rows) or if D has constant rows (repeated columns) is trivial
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for determining if a matrix is in Mm×n(Q)
1: function IsMatrixInM(F ,option)
2: Select any (i, j) ∈ {1 . . .m} × {1 . . . n}
3: for s← 1,m do
4: R(s) ← F(i)
5: end for
6: for t← 1, n do
7: C(t) ← F (j) − 1mfi,j
8: end for
9: Fˆ ← F −R− C
10: MatrixInM← 1
11: for l← 1,m do
12: for k ← 1, n do
13: if fˆl,k 6= 0 then
14: MatrixInM← 0
15: α← fˆl,k
16: break
17: end if
18: end for
19: if MatrixInM= 0 then
20: break
21: end if
22: end for
23: if option= 1 then
24: return (MatrixInM,α, l, k)
25: else
26: return (MatrixInM,R,C)
27: end if
28: end function
and we omit the corresponding algorithms. If any of the conditions are met, the game is
marked as strategically equivalent and the algorithm forms the corresponding equivalent
game matrices.
Finally, if none of the prior conditions are met the algorithm checks whether or not
D ∈ Mm×n(Q). If so, the game is marked as strategically equivalent and the algorithm
calculates the equivalent game matrices per Theorem 14. Otherwise, the algorithm marks
the game as not strategically equivalent.
Theorem 19. The SER0 algorithm determines whether the game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategi-
cally equivalent to a zero-sum game in time O(mn). In the affirmative case, the algorithm
calculates the equivalent zero-sum game in time O(mn).
Proof. By proposition 18, IsMatrixInM has time O(mn). The tests in lines 15 through
23 can be done with O(mn) comparisons per test. Forming the equivalent zero-sum game
matrices either consists of simple matrix assignment or scalar-matrix multiplication and
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matrix subtraction, which has time O(mn). This shows that overall the algorithm has time
O(mn).
Finally, we turn our attention to the SolveStratNE algorithm. The algorithm takes
as input two game matrices (A˜, B˜) ∈ Rm×n × Rm×n and outputs a NE if possible. The
algorithm simply calls SER0 in order to determine if the game has a guaranteed pure
strategy NE or a strategically zero-sum NE. If the game is guaranteed to have a pure
strategy NE, then that NE is calculated with a single call to a pure NE solver. Otherwise,
if the game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game, the algorithm calculates the NE
with a single call to an LP solver. Finally, if neither case is met the algorithm states this
fact and sets the NE strategies to an invalid strategy profile.
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm for determining strategically equivalent zero-sum game (SER0)
1: function SER0(A˜, B˜)
2: (aInM,α1, l1, k1)←IsMatrixInM(A˜, 1)
3: (bInM,α2, l2, k2)←IsMatrixInM(B˜, 1)
4: if aInM= 1 ∨ bInM= 1 then
5: pureStrat← 1
6: (Aˆ, Bˆ)← (A˜, B˜)
7: else if l1 6= l2 ∨ k1 6= k2 then
8: isStratEq← 0
9: else
10: γ ← −α2α1
11: if γ ≤ 0 then
12: isStratEq← 0
13: else
14: D ← B˜ + γA˜
15: if D = 0m×n then
16: isStratEq← 1
17: (Aˆ, Bˆ)← (γA˜, B˜)
18: else if colConstant(D) then
19: isStratEq← 1
20: (Aˆ, Bˆ)← (γA˜−D, B˜)
21: else if rowConstant(D) then
22: isStratEq← 1
23: (Aˆ, Bˆ)← (γA˜, B˜ −D)
24: else
25: (DInM,W,D2)←IsMatrixInM(D, 2)
26: if DInM= 0 then
27: isStratEq← 0
28: else
29: isStratEq← 1
30: (Aˆ, Bˆ)← (γA˜−W, B˜ −D2)
31: end if
32: end if
33: end if
34: end if
35: return (pureStrat,isStratEq,Aˆ, Bˆ)
36: end function
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Algorithm 4 Algorithm for solving a strategically zero-sum game
1: procedure SolveStratNE(A˜, B˜)
2: (pureStrat,isStratEq,Aˆ, Bˆ) ← StratZeroSum(A˜, B˜)
3: if pureStrat= 1 then
4: (p∗,q∗)← CalcPureNE(Aˆ, Bˆ)
5: else if isStratEq= 1 then
6: (p∗,q∗)← LP(Aˆ)
7: else
8: No NE found via strategic equivalence.
9: (p∗,q∗)← (0m,0n)
10: end if
11: return (p∗,q∗)
12: end procedure
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